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Abstract
Drawing upon anthropological theory of resistance and testing its 
limits, I will present a closer observation on how dissenting voices to the 
state project of Sharia in contemporary Aceh look on the ground. With-
out thereby renouncing its violent effects, some ethnographic stories I 
recount in this writing will reveal how the implementation of Sharia in 
contemporary Aceh has created inherently amusing situations and how it 
has occasionally become a humor producing machine. 
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“The worst enemy of authority is, therefore, dis-
dain and the safest means to undermine respect 
is laughter” (Hannah Arendt, 1970 : 45)
A. Introduction
 On June 12, 2015, I was at the Gampong Pineung Mosque, Banda 
Aceh. I joined a group of journalists who came there to report a public 
caning. Since 2010, along with my journalist friends I have attended more 
than 20 public canings across the Aceh province, collecting stories and 
observing people’s attitudes toward the revival of this classical form of 
spectacle punishment.1 Similar to the previous canings I attended, as the 
congregation comes out from Friday prayers I heard an announcement 
from inside the mosque calling for the offenders to be brought to the 
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stage. An official came onto the stage and read out the judge’s disposition 
from the Sharia Court. The first offender was taken out of the paddy 
wagon; she was a female. The official read through a microphone that the 
woman was arrested for having pre-marital sex. A sharia police (known in 
Aceh as WH, abbr.. Wilayatul Hisbah) escorted her onto the stage. The of-
ficial from the Sharia Court continued to announce that the offender will 
get eight strokes. The caning will not hurt, he said, as it is only intended 
to inflict shame. At the same time, a number of people who previously 
attended the Friday sermons hurriedly left the mosque yard. I have also 
seen this paradox several times. It became typical, nonetheless, but I came 
to realize how worth paying attention to it. In order to comprehend the 
reason why they were leaving the yard while others joined, I confronted 
and asked why they leave the arena. This time someone replied me “I am 
hungry, can’t skip my lunch in order to see this hipokrit thing.”2 Another 
man told me calmly that “Islam doesn’t teach you to humiliate people in 
front of public.”3 But, still, many people remained before the stage.
 Meanwhile, the person administering the punishment, who was 
holding a rattan cane about a metre and a half long and wearing a nin-
ja-like mask, came on the stage. This person is known asthe algojo. The 
official with a microphone gave the flagellator instructions to begin, and 
started to count from “one!”. Just a moment before the algojo hit the fe-
male offender with the rattan cane, she raised her hand and said that she 
needed to take something from her pocket. She took out a smartphone 
and took a selfie of her dancing body as she moved. The entire audience 
bursted out in laughter, including the officials. But it did not take a while, 
soon after she was insulted by the audience. They shouted and mocked 
her, ordering the algojo to strike her. The algojo delivered the punishment, 
striking her back eight times while she shouted, “I don’t feel ashamed! I 
don’t feel ashamed!”. The next offender, a male, was brought onto the 
stage and he got 10 strokes. The punishment was then declared over and 
everyone left. 
 When one reads about spectacle punishment reenacted in pres-
ent-day Aceh Michael Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the 
Prison (1977) might come into one’s mind. In this seminal work Michel 
Foucault traces profound changes in Western penal system from public 
torture to prison. Foucault starts by contrasting two stories of penalty: 
the public torture of Damien, the regicide in the mid-18 century, and the 
exhibition of the prisoners a century later. Foucault warns the readers 
about the disappearance of the public executions marking the emergence 
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of bio-power and the capitalist mode of production via the confluence 
of discipline. On the contrary, the modern Sharia state of Aceh seems to 
work in the opposite direction. Gaining significant support from Islamist 
groups and local elites, the local government adopted and modified forms 
of medieval Islamic punishment to have them incorporated within the 
instrument of modern state power. Hundreds of caning stages have been 
set up throughout the Aceh province where bodies of the Sharia violators 
will be put on display and hit by the executioners. 
 Despite the fact that the above execution is definitely a public, 
highly visible ceremony, what is different about the Sharia punishment 
and the public physical punishment we read about in Foucault’s Discipline 
and Punish is that the intention of physical punishment in present day 
Aceh is not torture nor to create useful individuals in order to increase 
the convict’s productive efficiency, but shaming. What are the actual the 
intended effects of public shaming? Why did the female offender respond 
in such a theatrical, if not humorous, way? What is the relationship be-
tween the audience to state power? And to what extent is Sharia intended 
to further the state’s project of extracting knowledge about Aceh and the 
Acehnese? 
  Many scholars have documented the implementation of Sharia 
law in Aceh (see for example in Hooker 2003; Blackburn 2004; Lindsey 
and Hooker 2007; Salim 2008; Buehler  2008; Ramly 2010; Fanani 2011; 
Feener 2013; Reed 2015), but only a few paid attention to a tension be-
tween state actors and non-state actors over the legitimacy, significance, 
and effectiveness of the implementation.4
 Here I choose to focus on “unintended effect” of the implementa-
tion of Sharia, looking at phenomena which unintentionally turned the 
Sharia regime of Aceh to become a humor producing machine. How is 
it possible such ritual punishment I describe above be fertile for political 
humor? Furthermore, how do we determine whether satirical action is re-
sistance? I will examine what constitutes political in humor and vice versa, 
how humor can become subversive and how they became part of the set 
of actions that oppositional non-movements use against the Sharia regime 
in Aceh.
 In the following section, I will provide a historical backdrop for 
this present research. My approach to discuss the implementation of Sha-
ria in Aceh will be a broad adaptation of the analysis of “la longue duree”, 
a historical totality in space and time, as invoked by French historian Fer-
nand Braudel (1980). In searching “ways to produce ethically responsible 
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knowledge in a world riven by violence and dominative forms of power” 
(Murphy et.al 2011), I owe to the very tradition of many anthropologists 
working on Indonesia undertaking an interdisciplinary project joining 
ethnography and history (see for example Siegel 1969, 1986;  Steedly 
1993, 2013; Tsing 1993; Pamberton 1997; Spyer 2000; Li 2001; Stoler 
2008; Strassler 2010; Rutherford 2013). Juxtaposing people’s attitudes 
toward the implementation of the law with local political histories, the 
following section will examine the meaning of today’s calls for the appli-
cation of the Sharia in Aceh, the extent to which some Acehnese see it as 
an extension or a departure from previous forms of Islamic punishment 
while some others see it in the opposite direction.
 
B. Aceh History and the Modern State Project of Sharia
 In 1619 a French armed expedition led by General Augustin De 
Beaulieu sailed to Sumatra. The fleet, known as the “Fleet of Montmo-
rency,” arrived in Bandar Aceh in 1621 and remained in the city port 
for approximately 6 months (from January 30 to July 25). At that time, 
the sultanate of Aceh Darussalam was already a center of trade and mil-
itary power in Southeast Asia. Being in Aceh for six months, Beaulieu 
observed and left us one of the best accounts of Acehnese society in the 
early 17th century. It was the period when Aceh was under the reign of 
Iskandar Muda, who ruled the sultanate from 1607 to 1636. The image of 
the Sultan’s power has been central in the Acehnese popular memory un-
til today. Iskandar Muda is remembered as the greatest ruler and lawgiver 
of Aceh, the Shadow of God on earth who once ruled Aceh in accordance 
with the Book of Allah. 
 In his accounts, Beaulieu put details that are gripping enough for 
us to imagine how absolute and unchallenged the Sultan’s power was. 
With regard to the enforcement of the Sharia law, Beaulieu writes “every 
day the King would have people’s noses cut off, eyes dug out, castrations, 
feet cut off, or hands, ears and other parts mutilated, very often for some 
very small matter” (cf. Reid 1995: 67). But, as Beaulieu continues, “no 
one who has been punished in this way (mutilated), whether by the King’s 
order or by the judge’s, suffers any disgrace on this account, no matter 
what crime he has committed; and if anyone taunts him about it, and he 
kills him in retaliation, he will not be punished for this, since they consid-
er that the culprit has been sentenced by a judge and has paid a sufficient 
penalty. He should not be blamed any further for this crime, as anyone 
can make a mistake” (Reid 1995: 68).   
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 From the last sentence of De Beaulieu’s story, quoted above, we 
can quickly notice a sharp contrast between the physical punishment un-
der the Sultan and the physical punishment as “re-enacted” by the contem-
porary Sharia authority in Aceh. As I have underlined above, the purpose 
of the contemporary Sharia punishment is not to inflict pain but inflicting 
shame upon the offenders. This of course doesn’t match with the romanti-
cized Sharia laws under the sultan, which clearly protected people from 
any disgrace after they fulfilled the punishment.Such an inconsistency, 
as far as I am concerned, has never been discussed in any contemporary 
“discursive debates,” to use Talal Asad’s concept, concerning the extent to 
which the current implementation of the laws depart from previous forms 
of Islamic punishment. Besides being implemented as a result of political 
negotiation, in the early days of its contemporary implementation, one 
could argue that nothing was important for Acehnese Muslims more than 
to withstand any attempt to challenge the importance of religion in their 
lives (Siegel 2014). That is convincing when one thinks of colonialism 
(the rule of unbelievers), the bloody armed conflict, and the tsunami that 
accompanied the history of this region.
 Acehnese history for the last two centuries is a series of catastro-
phes. Defeat by the Dutch, failure to gain Japanese support after aiding 
them, then a revolution that knocked local leaders out of office but that 
left nothing satisfactory to replace them (Siegel 2012). Since then, it ap-
pears to be impossible to write about Aceh without mentioning Islam 
and resistance. Both terms feature prominently and appear almost inter-
twined in most studies about history of Aceh and Acehnese politics. Islam 
takes central stage in the construction of Acehnese identity as inscribed in 
an Acehnnese proverb “lagee zat ngon sifeut,“ ‘inseparable, like essence and 
its attribute’ (see more in Siegel 1969; Alfian 1997; Aspinall 2009; Graft 
2010; Samuels 2012; Kloos 2013). A romanticized past of Acehnese resis-
tance to Dutch colonialism made this construction stronger. Acehnese 
bravery and rebelliousness are inscribed in stories of the Holy War against 
the colonial infidels. Acehnese historical recognition no doubt owes a lot 
to the presence of Islam in the region and the image of the colonial ene-
my. The role of the ulama, Muslim religious clerics, who led the struggles, 
is glorified to emphasize the centrality of Islam to the movement’s ide-
ology (Alfian Sjamsuddin 1985; Reid 1979; Sulaiman 1999;). Acehnese 
orientation towards political resistance and Islamic identity were further 
reinforced during the National Revolution (1945-1949) and became com-
plex after national independence. In the eyes of the Indonesian central 
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government, Aceh has always been a special and troublesome part of the 
nation. The history of Acehnese resistance to the Dutch was essential to 
national identity and narratives of liberation from the colonizer, yet Aceh 
heroism and exceptionalism threatened Indonesian nationalism (Drexler 
2008). What follows after that were stories about Muslims opposing Mus-
lims. 
 In 1953, after wholeheartedly supporting Indonesia’s struggle for 
independence, Aceh started to clash with Jakarta. The first Acehnese re-
volt against the central government began when their leaders proclaimed 
allegiance to Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia under Imam Kartosu-
wiryo. The idea of Indonesia was still there; the struggle aimed to make 
Indonesia more Islamic. Soekarno saw Islam was the cause, and thus it 
became the solution to be offered. Sharia law was granted for Aceh in a 
ceasefire, which was agreed upon in 1959. In May 1959 Aceh became the 
Special Region (Daerah Istimewa) of Aceh. This gave Aceh autonomy in 
the fields of religion, customs, and education (van Dijk 1981; Sjamsuddin 
1985). Only three months after the ceasefire, Soekarno proclaimed a re-
turn to the 1945 constitution. The ceasefire accomplished nothing. This 
provoked tension and dissatisfaction of the Acehnese with the central 
government.   
 In 1976, another revolt emerged after the forces of Suharto mo-
nopolized Acehnese resources (Tiro 1982; Kell 1995; Hasan 2000). The 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) sought to establish an independent state, 
and this rebellion movement was essentially secular-nationalist in ori-
entation (Aspinal & Crouch 2002; Schulze 2004; Patria 2009; Aspinall 
2008, 2009, 2013). The Indonesian Army, through its notorious special 
forces (Kopassus), sought to crush this bid. They designated Aceh as a 
“special combat zone” (Daerah Operasi Militer/DOM), leading to the 
death and disappearance of thousands of Acehnese. According to many 
studies of the Aceh conflict, exploitation of natural resources and human 
rights abuses, thus not Islam, was the main cause behind the desire of 
the Acehnese people to secede from Indonesia (Sulaiman 1999; Siapno 
2002; Sukma 2004; Reid 2006; Schulze 2004, 2007; Drexler 2008; Patria; 
Aspinall, 2009). In 1999 when almost two million Acehnese gathered in 
front of the Grand Mosque of Banda Aceh, what they demanded was not 
an independent state but the need for security, prosperity and a sense of 
belonging after the protracted three decades civil war between GAM and 
the Indonesian military, which killed at least 20,000 Acehnese. But the 
central government again misunderstood the Acehnese voice. 
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In the subsequent part I will show how this misunderstanding went 
on and eventually led to a backlash from some ordinary Acehnese. 
C. Sharia as the Modern State Project 
In 1999, as an effort to quell the GAM and presumably to prevent 
the Acehnese public from joining the movement, the central government 
granted the implementation of Sharia to the Aceh province. Granting 
Sharia law to the Aceh province was of course a political experiment since 
it goes against the basic principles of Indonesia’s Pancasila state ideology. 
Hamzah Haz, the Indonesian vice president at that time, told the press 
that the decision to apply Sharia in Aceh was “uji coba,” a test (Amal & 
Panggabean, 2003: 58). President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed into law 
an autonomy package that included comprehensive regulations on estab-
lishing Shariah courts and Shariah bylaws. Based on that legislation that 
was drafted, discussed, and approved in Jakarta, Aceh established its first 
Sharia court in 2003. 
 As I am writing this article, Sharia law has been implemented in 
the Indonesian province of Aceh for more than 15 years. Under the law 
No.44/2001, Sharia was officially promulgated as part of special auton-
omy status granted by the central government of Indonesia to end the 
Aceh conflict. At first, many Acehnese also perceived the implementation 
of Sharia would be the answer to the pervasive corruption and injustice 
spread during the conflict. It came together with a longing for the glori-
ous past of Aceh. The Acehnese elites who supported the Sharia proposal 
had actively tried to convince people that in precolonial times Islamic law 
had already been implemented in Aceh, and its modern absence was only 
due to the impact of European colonialism (Ali Muhammad 2003: 327, 
cf. Basri 2010: 271; Hefner 2011). 
 With the establishment of the Office of Islamic Sharia (Dinas 
Syariat Islam), Sharia Courts (Mahkamah Syariat) and the Sharia Police 
(Wilayatul Hisbah), all Sharia instruments were complete and ready to per-
form. The result has been a number of bylaws (officially called qanun) pro-
moting ‘correct’ Islamic behaviour, forbidding non-Sunni practices and 
beliefs, making punishable acts like gambling (maisir) and the consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages (khamr), giving local authorities the power to 
act upon and punish illicit sexual relations (khalwat), and introducing 
corporal punishment with the use of rattan cane in public. 
 However, it was not until after the tsunami and the end of the 
political conflict that the new laws and institutions became widely visible 
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and active in the province. The Sharia authority publicly caned its first 
Sharia violator in 2005. Why in 2005 and not during the previous five 
years? Many insiders observers assumed that it had to do with another 
catastrophe that hit the region and its subsequent development (see for 
example in Kloos 2014; Samuels 2009). The tsunami that struck many 
Southeast Asian countries on 26 December 2004 hit the Aceh prov-
ince hardest. The tsunami wave killed almost 300,000 Acehnese in less 
than one hour after the powerful earthquakes and caused tremendous, 
long-lasting suffering in the coastal areas of Aceh. The force of natural 
disaster finally revealed larger social and political problem of Aceh, which 
had previously been hidden from international view (Good et al. 2008; 
Good & Good 2013; Samuels 2012; Good, Good & Grayman 2015). 
Within a month of the tsunami, peace negotiation were resumed, which 
led to a peace agreement being signed in Helsinki, Finland, on August 15, 
2005. 
 The province that was totally closed off to foreigners prior to the 
tsunami was suddenly opened to the wider world. At the same time, the 
intensity of Sharia law implementation dramatically increased. The fear 
of foreign influence, conversion to other religions, and radical ideas be-
gan to develop (or be incited) along with the reconstruction and rehabil-
itation projects in Aceh (Kloos 2014, 2015). The upholding of morality 
and waging of war on all forms of immorality became the main agenda 
of Sharia authority. Through local regulation (Qanun or ‘Perda,’ Peratur-
an Daerah), Sharia matters have been institutionalized into a government 
agency. More Sharia Police were recruited, and they have finally been inte-
grated into civilian police units (Satpol PP) in order to increase the agen-
cy’s force to intervene. Those are the officials who nowadays go on patrols 
to guard against anything considered a threat to Sharia implementation.  
 Furthermore, the peace agreement between the GAM and the In-
donesian Government successfully transformed former members of the 
combatants into administrators, constructing a new circle of elites. This 
transformation also created opportunities and new spaces for economic 
and socio-political competition and contestation. GAM transformed and 
brought its former members into a local political party, known today as 
Partai Aceh (The Aceh Party). This party won general elections in 2006 
and 2012, and now occupying most of political positions within the lo-
cal government of Aceh. Ironically, many former GAM members who 
previously refused to accept the Sharia proposal are now supporting the 
implementation of Sharia laws. They found “Sharia” useful as a means of 
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political control, and today they have extended its force into a more com-
plex ensemble of legal practices and institutions. After the peace deal, the 
conditions of military emergency returned under the guise of Sharia. Spy-
ing, raids, detention and all kinds of prohibitions employed during the 
military emergency have been re-implemented by Sharia authorities. The 
current political situation in Aceh after the armed conflict might resonate 
to what has been discussed in many anthropological studies about the 
irony in the “postcolony,” where power inequalities continue to persist in 
a host of different ways as the former colonized elites embody the role of 
colonizer (Mbembe 1986, 1992; Comaroff & Comaroff 2006; Ferguson 
2007; Good et al. 2008; Steedly 2013). 
A number of new controversial regulations in the name of Sha-
ria have been endorsed and executed by many GAM former combatants, 
those who have become popular local political figures in the last decade. 
In 2010, the local government of West Aceh issued a qanun forbidding 
women to wear jeans and ‘tight’ clothing. This regulation was subsequent-
ly followed by the more odd qanun issued by the regent of South Aceh, 
Husein Yusuf, who strangely prohibited male civil servants from having 
mouthaches. In the North, the Mayor of Lhokseumawe, Suaidi Yahya, in 
2011 promulgated his own Sharia law banning women from straddling 
motorcycles. The nature of Sharia laws seem to vary arbitrarily from re-
gion to region within the province. The city of Banda Aceh and Meula-
boh, West Aceh, have restricted any form of outdoor and indoor perform-
ing arts that do not strictly conform to Sharia law. To hold an event or an 
art performance in Aceh requires passing through three hoops to obtain 
three different permissions; from the municipality, from the Sharia Of-
fice, and from the Aceh Ulama Council. Failure to obtain permission 
from any one of these may result in the event being declared illegal and 
able to be shut down. Moreover, the implementation of a night curfew in 
several areas, such as North, East, Central Aceh and Banda Aceh, play a 
large part in extinguishing enthusiasm for the performing arts across the 
region.
It is important to note that from the early days of its implementa-
tion, dissenting voices to the state project of Sharia have emerged and 
come from various segments of society. They might vary by education, 
political views, and gender. From a legal point of view, attempts to enforce 
Islamic laws in Indonesia have almost always resulted in conflict among 
competing systems of law and customary or civil law (Bowen 2003; Salim 
2008; Hefner 2008). From political point of view, I have indicated above 
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that before the GAM leaders signed the peace agreement with the Indone-
sian government, they used to be a leading voice to reject the Sharia pro-
posal. They also received supports from some elements in the Acehnese 
society. From civil society point of view, there were two groups critical to 
the central government’s Sharia proposal. I divided them into two groups 
because they have different visions on the subject matter. The first group 
was dominated by the traditionalist Muslim scholars, known as the dayah 
Ulama. Tgk Nuruzzahri or Waled Nu, was one of the influential Aceh 
ulama who once told in a public seminar that the Sharia (in Acehnese, 
syari’at) applied now in Aceh actually means ‘syari ‘ab’ (Acehnese slang, 
lit. look for a free meal), a project to feed the government officers. He 
made fun of it by using that local term and called the proposal was no 
more than ‘tipu Sukarno’ or Sukarno’s trick to prevaricate the Acehnese 
people. He referred to the Sukarno’s policy to end the DI/TII movement 
in 1950s where the central government also granted Sharia in order to 
win the heart of the Acehnese. However, the dayah Ulama’s views on the 
current government’s interpretations of Sharia have always been ambiva-
lent. While they urge the local government of Aceh not to “play” with a 
partial understanding of Islamic law, they also demand Sharia should be 
implemented stronger and thoroughly (kaffah), and ask the government 
to consul with them before passing the regulations. In other words, they 
would have been supportive to the implementation of the law had they 
were involved to determine what constitutes Sharia in the regulations 
(Fuadi, 2001). 
Furthermore, there was another group comprised human rights ac-
tivists and university intellectuals. They rejected Sharia proposal on the 
basis of human rights understanding. Many of them were aware that Sha-
ria will be transformed into and back up by the military forces to expand 
their control upon public aspiration (Sjamsuddin-Ishak 2002). Critical 
reviews on the Sharia proposal were raised by some Acehnese intellectuals 
such as Fuad Mardhatillah (2009), Affan Ramly (2010), Husni Mubarak 
A. Latief (2010), Teuku Harits Muzanni, Asrizal Luthfi (2011) and Teu-
ku Muhammad Jafar Sulaiman. (2011). In 2009, a significant number 
of human right activists established a joint forum to be named Jaringan 
Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariat - JMSPS (Civil Society’s Network Concern-
ing Sharia). This forum comprises several local NGOs, such as the Hu-
man Rights-NGO coalition, Aceh Legal Aid Foundation (LBH), Relawan 
Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan (women volunteers for humanitarian is-
sues), Flower Aceh, KKTGA, Komunitas Tikar Pandan, Aceh Judicial & 
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Monitoring Institute, Violet Grey, Women Voice Radio, Gender Work-
ing Group, SEIA, Fatayat Nahdatul Ulama, Sekolah Menulis Dokarim, 
Kontras Aceh, Center for Human Rights Studies-Unsyiah, Sri Ratu Sa-
fiatuddin Foundation and others. In 2010 the JMSPS group successfully 
pushed governor Irwandi Yusuf to postpone the implementation of the 
qanun Jinayah (Islamic Penal Law).
Broadly speaking, since the Sharia laws in Aceh has been imple-
mented through the machinery of an inefficient and unprofessional state 
with a long legacy of corruption, manipulation, and authoritarianism, it 
certainly has not been immune to resistance and contestations (Feener 
2015; Idria 2015). It has become more visible within the last two years, 
but still far cry from becoming a movement to overthrow state power.
D. On Sharia Contestation & the Function of Humor for the Less 
Powerful
 Power and resistance, according to Foucault (1978), are correlative 
concepts. The possibility for resistance to emerge always goes hand in 
hand with histories of groups suffering from power imbalance. Foucault 
also believes that power is not merely sustained by violence and coercion. 
The ability of a regime to make people believe in it or to force them to act 
as if they believed in it lies not only in coercive power but also in authority 
and the capacity to monopolize authority. Theoretically speaking, just like 
power, resistance has become ubiquitous, and there is no consensus on 
what the term actually means. No matter how far one travels back in the 
history of resistance studies, the terminology has always been problemat-
ic, with significant contradictions and disagreements; this remains true in 
more recent texts (see for example from Foucault 1978; de Certeau 1980; 
Scott 1985, 1991; Bourdieu 1991; Wedeen 1999;Hollander & Einwoh-
ner 2004; Seymour 2006; Duncome 2008; Butcher & Velayutham 2009; 
Camps-Febrer 2012; Medina 2013). 
 Many scholars from a great many disciplinary perspectives across 
the social sciences, ranging from history to anthropology, have been in-
volved in resistance studies. Efforts to conceptualize resistance have been 
enormous and rigorous, from choosing “whether any given act fits into a 
fixed box called resistance” (Ortner 1995: 175) to how it is formed from 
relatively organized and fixed movement to less institutionalized and 
more everyday forms of resistance. In both a concealed manner or an 
open confrontation, there are many forms of articulations (see for exam-
ple in Comaroff 1985; Abu Lughod 1986; Brown 1996; Kastrinou-The-
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odoropoulou 2009), practices (Tilly 1977; Scott 1985, Adas 1986; Scott 
1990; Ong 1987, 2013; Guha 1997; Reed-Danahay 1993; Collins 2009) 
and significations (Stoler 1986; Cooper 1992; Hoffman 1999; Seymour 
2009; Lugg 2010), seen as the complex network of resistance actions. Re-
garding everyday forms of resistance, we are also equipped with a plenty 
of useful concepts from E.P Thompson’s “counter-theatre” (1993), W.F. 
Wartheim’s “counterpoint,” and James C. Scott’s “weapons of the weak” 
(1985), to Václav Havel’s “power of the powerless” (1985 [1979]). Still, 
this wide range of studies has shown that resistance is a complicated and 
heterogenous phenomenon.
 The history of Aceh is full of stories of oppressions and of fierce 
resistance, especially against any infringements on its freedom to arrange 
its own affairs. I wish to make clear at this stage that when I refer to the 
word resistance in this present study, I do not mean “resistance” strictly 
in the sense of organized and relatively fixed movement to overthrow the 
government. As I have shown above, there have been enough studies con-
cerning that type of resistance overwhelmingly attributed the Acehnese 
almost to the point that one might say that ‘where there are Acehnese 
there is resistance,’ pointing to centuries of Acehnese armed struggles in 
combating colonial powers and a series of armed revolts against the Re-
public. 
 In seeking to map out how Acehnese Muslims “humorous” ex-
perience in contesting a new authoritarian religious regime, namely the 
Sharia state, I follow James C. Scott’s (1985, 1992, 1996), rather than see-
ing “resistance as organization,” I choose to look at less visible, every-day 
forms of resistance articulated in various modes of articulations, as sug-
gested by Scott, like “foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, 
feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage.” Some Sharia resistors explored 
in my study are indeed adopting defensive strategies (i.e., subversion rath-
er than confrontation) and often performed their criticism in unconven-
tional manners. I paid attention to the line between “public vs hidden 
transcripts.” This is the line where Scott sees the battle for “testing the 
limits,” where subordinates, unsure of dominants’ effective powers, might 
bring hidden transcripts to a public sphere (Scott, 1990: p.192; see also 
Camps-Febrer 2012). Hidden transcripts are usually opposed to the public 
display of language, rituals and behaviors that a group or individual per-
forms in front of others.5
James Scott’s concepts “weapons of the weak” and “hidden tran-
scripts” have been foundational in theorizing resistance in the discipline 
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of anthropology. However, in some cases applying the concepts “weap-
ons of the weak” and “hidden transcripts” to attribute Acehnese count-
er-actions against the Sharia authority would have been be problematic, 
since criticism to the state project of Sharia has not been merely voiced by 
less powerful people and not always hidden from public. Instead they al-
ready became visible as a variety of more powerful groups have already in-
volved. With the increasing openness of public discourse in post-disaster 
and post-conflict Aceh, critiques of the Sharia authority’s arroganceand 
hypocrisyspread beyond coffee house conversations to take a prominent 
position in popular media discourse (Idria 2013; Feener 2015). Further-
more, there is an intrinsic relationship between the sovereign and audi-
ence which makes the regime able to continue exercise its power through 
ceremony and the spread of violence. People who mock and laugh at the 
Sharia authority in many cases are the same people who deliberately at-
tend ceremony of spectacle punishment. 
 This is understandable if one would accept the logic that the con-
temporary Sharia regime is a distinctive regime established in “the post-
colony,” to use the words of Achille Mbembe, which “seeks to institution-
alize itself, in order to achieve its legitimacy and hegemony in the form 
of a fetish” (Mbembe 1992: 4). But, by having this logic I should then be 
more specific about what I mean by resistance within this study. The term 
resistance here refers to a distinctive situation that arises out of encoun-
ters and interactions and derive from “illicit cohabitation” between rulers 
and the ruled who happen to share the same living space – a mode of rela-
tionship that Mbembe has called it as “mutual zombification” (Mbembe, 
ibid). A distinctive situation unintentionally continues to create amusing 
situations. Condition best described in Anna Tsing’s terminology (2000) 
of “friction.” Friction is not just about slowing things down, but “the awk-
ward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across 
difference as they arise out of encounters and interactions” (Tsing 2000: 
4-6). Friction can be something very trivial, as she put, “it can be the fly in 
the elephant nose”. 
 Here, in this very context, the complexity of history, Islam and 
the construction of Acehnese identity which always goes hand in hand 
has no doubt contributed to a more complicated power relation between 
the current regime and its subject. A complex situation that makes sense 
when one thinks of how Acehnese identity is so entwined with Islam that 
critical voices to the Sharia project in general are subdued due to the fear 
of being labeled anti-Islam. Therefore, just as Sigmund Freud in Jokes and 
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Their Relation to the Unconscious (1963 [1907]) claimed, in this very condi-
tion humor has become “a survivalist response to the vicissitudes of life” 
in Aceh.6
 Henk Driessen (2015) points out that the terms humor, joking, 
and laughter are often used interchangeably and are part of the semantic 
field of the comic, which in turn belongs to the domain of expressive 
culture. There is no single acceptable definition of humor, but scholars 
generally agree that it revolves around a sense of the incongruous or ludi-
crous (Driessen 2015: 416). Stuart Hall (1997) points out that humorous 
strategies are powerful in their capacity to “unfix” dominant meanings 
through subversive satire and parody, and to affix new meanings that de-
stabilize the underlying assumptions of the stereotype.
 There have been numerous anthropological studies about the use 
of humor in repressive political settings challenging oppression in a differ-
ent way than traditional resistance (Pi-Sunyer 1977; Johansen 1991; Stok-
ker 2001; Sorensen 2008; Kazarian 2011). Some researchers dealing with 
the sociology of power and social movements have described laughter, 
political humor, and the like as creative reactions to the greatest concen-
tration of power in society, seen as a sublimation of aggression, a form of 
political resistance also used for therapeutic ends and for social commen-
tary and critique, and hence a safe release for aggressiveness against a su-
perior force (Schutz 1977; Apte 1985; Billig 2005; Davies 2007; Berdaneh 
2011; Wadeen 2011; Zimbardo 2014;). There are also a few writers who 
found comedy at the heart of state power (see for example Bakhtin 1984; 
Furnivall, Mbembe 1992, 2003; Zizek 1993; Rutherford 2012).7
 Given its specific context, both historical and material, I argue that 
the form of humor under the post-colonial Sharia regime has a far greater 
personal, political, intellectual, and historical importance than is the case 
with sarcasm and satire performed in traditional or democratic societies. 
The fetishization of power through ceremony and display of symbols as 
well as the spread of fear through violence and unpredictability directed 
by mediocre state apparatuses make possible carnivalesque encounters to 
happen and allow the oppressed to make fun of the absurdity of their sit-
uation. Mocking and laughter are parts of these rituals. Laughter, coming 
from examples I collected in my preliminary research, is often embodied 
in carnivalesque situations where smiling or laughing came together with 
feeling uneasy about smiling or laughing. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) has de-
scribed that the carnival is a period of time where normal rules do not 
apply, the social distance between the high and the lowly is diminished, 
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the mighty mocks and “the world [is] turned upside down.” 
There is a parallel between the jokes told under the Sharia regime 
in Aceh and the carnival behavior of medieval times when the rites and 
rituals of the Church were burlesqued in Bakhtin’s Rabelais. But I also 
argue that Bakhtinian ideas do not equally apply to all inherently amusing 
situations in Aceh today. It is clearly related to popular protest and resis-
tance but the nature of the relationship is very problematic. Thus, rath-
er than looking the obscenity and the grotesque merely at “non-official” 
cultures, the province of ordinary people, again I tend to follow Achille 
Mbembe to see the grotesque and the obscene as two essential elements 
intrinsic to all system of domination in the postcolony, including under 
the Sharia regime of Aceh.
Like other regimes in “the postcolony,” which are characterized by a 
distinctive style of political improvisation, the Sharia regime of Aceh has 
so far effectively adopted and translated Sharia as a distinct set of cultural 
repertoires and powerfully evocative concepts. Yet the regime’s aim to 
discipline the population and to “organize” people’s desire is far from suc-
cessful, to underline it once again, because it runs through the machin-
ery of an inefficient and unprofessional state. Mbembe in his study also 
introduces the term “illicit cohabitation” and “mutual zombification” 
to describe forms of postcolonial relationship. It is “a relationship made 
fraught by the very fact of the commandement and its ‘subjects’ having to 
share the same living space” (Mbembe 1992: 4). By recognizing these two 
categories one can also avoid to always describe the postcolonial relation-
ship in term of a classic definition of resistance or collaboration, rather 
the grotesque irrationality of power. Thus, it is the hallmark of grotesque 
humor.
E. Sarcasm and Satire: Shaming the Powerful
 The story from the caning stage I recall in the beginning of this 
article provides us an example how the effect of spectacle punishment 
reenacted by the contemporary Sharia authority went not to the direction 
it aimed, shaming. The action of the woman offender on the caning stage, 
through dance and selfie, and the audience who shouted and laughed at 
her and the authority arguably did not reach that quality. Rather, it was 
perceived just like a performance. The offender action was certainly not 
to tell a joke to anyone who laughed at her. Instead, she was sarcastic as 
in an unexpected way she ridiculed both the authority and the audience. 
Taking selfie was her satirical weapon to mock their inability to inflict 
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shame on her. Of course, for an ethnographer, there is also a strong moral 
component to take. 
 Since Acehnese identity is so entwined with Islam, counter-narra-
tives to the state project of Sharia in general are subdued due to the fear 
of being labelled anti-Islam (see my work and Ichwan, 2011). Many indi-
viduals critical to the implementation of Sharia tend to adopt defensive 
strategy, subversion rather than confrontation. Pretending to follow while 
disobeying the laws and the authority. In many cases their actions very 
much embedded in sarcasm and satire resulted in conflict and competing 
systems. 
 Counter action to the taken by many people were very much em-
bedded in what the locals termed as ulok or meu-ulok (lit. mocking to make 
fun). At first glance, ulok might be equivalent to sarcasm and satire, terms 
conceptualized in humor and interpersonal communication studies. Fine 
& Martin (1990) note that sarcasm is a distinctive style of discourse, as 
a societal form of biting communication, often involving the opposite 
of what is meant, that is “inversion.” Sarcasm announces a position, the 
attitude of the rhetor toward the target, but may miss its target with an un-
sympathetic or naive audience. Satire, as they continue, more than most 
humor, has the reputation of being subtle, so subtle that many might 
miss it. Its rhetorical force often overlaps with that of sarcasm. Satire, 
at its roots, is profoundly moral. According to Waller (2006) the word 
“satire” from the ancient Greek satyr, the mythical drunk, “hedonistic or 
otherwise naughty man-goat.” Unlike sarcasm, it is not necessarily biting 
or hostile. It always has a moral component. The satirist is acutely aware 
of the gaps between the way that things are and the way they should be 
(Elliot, 1978). For the locals ulok is often inspired within unusual political 
circumstances that allow them to deal with the absurdity of their situa-
tion. 
 In 2009, Putroe Sejati, a queer community in Banda Aceh, host-
ed a controversial contest called Pemilihan Ratu Waria Aceh (Aceh Queer 
Queen Festival). The contestants wore proper Muslim dress codes as in-
structed by Sharia law. The organizer also followed the official protocol to 
include Quranic recitations and prayers for the opening and the closing 
of the event. As the event was open to the Banda Aceh public, Islamist 
groups were subsequently outraged and demanded the dissolution of Pu-
troe Sejati. However, they could not stop the event because the organizer 
was able to show the letter of approval from the ulama council and none 
of these queer contestants attending the event were wearing “inappropri-
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ate” dress. Provoked by angered Islamist groups, the Aceh Ulama Council 
(MPU) told the press that they were fooled by Putroe Sejati members who 
falsified the permit of the event. According to Tgk Muslim Ibrahim, a 
leading figure of the Aceh ulama council and the official that signed the 
letter of approval for the event, Putroe Sejati actually asked for permission 
only to organize a charity concert, without ever mentioning the queer 
contest in the letter. 
 Furthermore, the public profile of Aceh’s punk community has 
evolved considerably over the past years. As the community grew and 
became more visible, the authority declared the phenomenon as devi-
ant. The government of Banda Aceh thus placed the ‘problem’ of punks 
squarely in the context of the implementation of Islamic law. Since 2011 
the government has launched a moral project called pembinaan “to re-ed-
ucate” the punks in order to bring them back to the path of Islam (Id-
ria, 2015). The state Sharia police regularly crack down, and repeatedly 
stormed the city park where the youngsters usually gathered, rounding 
up anyone wearing punk dress styles, mohawk hair, tattoos and chains. 
In many occasions the Acehnese punks fought back against the officials, 
resulting in open clashes. But, they youngsters also showed peculiar, if 
not subversive, ways in undermining the authority as they keep going to 
gather in the city park next to the Grand Mosque of Baiturrahman, which 
is the iconic and religious landmark of the city of Banda Aceh. The punk 
members, most of them also wanted to show that they are practicing Mus-
lims. They often join the prayers at the grand mosque while still wearing 
their punk clothing, by intention in direct confrontation with the more 
conservative members of the mosque. 
 Not only performed by a certain limited group, occasionally, there 
was also a mode of spontaneous action where a large number of people 
involved in disobeying the Sharia law in hilarious ways. The New Year’s 
Eve has become an annual comical event for the Acehnese people, espe-
cially in the city of Banda Aceh. Every year since 2010, on 31 December 
the government of Banda Aceh and the Ulama Council (MPU) would 
repeatedly release a joint announcement to prohibit people from cele-
brating New Year’s Eve, on religious ground. The authority ordered the 
Wilayat al-Hisbah (the Sharia Police) to seal off the beach nearby Banda 
Aceh in order to prevent the unlawful acts of those celebrating the event. 
Fireworks and trumpets sold for the New Year’s Eve celebration would 
be seized, the government announced. However, as it happened every 
year, at midnight of the New Year Eve fireworks would explode in the air 
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and trumpets would be sounded everywhere. Thousands of people would 
walk, driving their cars and motorcycles, blowing trumpets and illuminat-
ing fireworks to the sky of the city of Banda Aceh. This kind of situation 
has been evidently not planned as people came out of their own volition 
to join the celebrations. I witnessed several moments when the Sharia 
Police patrolling the city lost their power and were not able to prevent 
the crowds from disobeying their restrictions. Many people would even 
drive their vehicles on the right side of the city road rather than following 
the rule in which one has to do it in reverse. When confronted by the 
police people would argue that they were driving in such a way following 
Islamic values which prefer the right side rather than the left side. People 
also argued that trumpet should not be banned on the New Year’s Eve, 
because there is the angel of the trumpet in Islamic eschatology. It was, 
above all, satirical argument. Many people, mostly youngsters, often burst 
out laughing after arguing with the officials. 
 The above hilarious examples show that in many cases the way 
people of Aceh deal with the new regime of conduct prefer to avoid con-
frontative actions. Instead, they articulate, sometimes negotiate, and per-
form their counter views against the government interpretation of Sharia 
in ways that require one to grasp and to understand them beyond conven-
tional notion. Often embedded in humor, they continue to contest and 
destabilize the power of the Sharia regime.8
F. Concluding Remark
 As Martin Sorensen has coined “looking more closely at the un-
usual, we can often get more information about the less unusual” (So-
rensen, 2008: 169), here I provide a counter-narrative to dominant media 
portrayals of Acehnese, often as the most fanatic Muslim community in 
Indonesia and supportive in total to the local government project of Sha-
ria. My study first show that despite the more aggressive Sharia project 
directed by the government to have a total control on its population, 
Acehnese attitudes toward the implementation of the law have shown 
otherwise. More and more people have become more open to express 
their critical views challenging the implementation of that religious law. 
Besides, there are some segments of Acehnese society who continue to 
destabilize the government project of Sharia in more subtle ways. In many 
ways they are hilarious. 
 Anthropologists argue that comedy and humor may be used in 
order to break tension, to create a sense of community, to build solidar-
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ity through in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion, as a method of 
coping with injustice or trauma, as a survival tactic, as a form of political 
resistance, for therapeutic ends, and for social commentary and critique 
(for example in Apte 1985; Billig 2005; Davies 2007; Zimbardo 2014; ). As 
Stuart Hall (1997) notes humorous strategies are powerful in the capacity 
to “unfix” dominant meanings through subversive satire and parody, and 
affix new meanings that destabilize the underlying assumptions of the 
stereotype. However, this subject has been ignored in contemporary study 
of Aceh, and Islam. Attending to comedy and anecdote as “unintended 
effects” of the implementation of Sharia, my study offers a different lens 
on what Sharia means in everyday life. Understanding counter views on 
Sharia beyond the old notion of resistance, I found the concepts of both 
“illicit cohabitation” and “mutual zombification” introduced by Achille 
Mbembe are useful to describe the logic, the dynamic and what cause 
the unstable relationship between the dominant and the subordinate 
in a post colonial setting like Aceh. Having this logic made possible for 
me to understand tensions, derive from actions and articulations toward 
Sharia regulations, between the authority and state subject that may be 
bothering processes of rule and marking limits of sovereign power as it is 
performed. But at the same time, these processes continue to productively 
create metaphors and keep always open for us possibilities to grasp the 
meaning of everyday practices and the constitution of society. My work, 
above all, is timely and challenges dominant narratives in popular media 
that portray Aceh as the most conservative region in the Archipelago. Ev-
ery time there is an incident relating to Sharia law, it becomes magnified 
in the media, contributing to an un-nuanced view of the region’s politics. 
I strongly argue that Aceh is in fact a vibrant open society with a complex 
arrangement of internal political divergences.
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Endnotes:
1 Using a different angle, I have discussed public caning in Aceh as the state’s 
highly visual politics of re-education through performance in my article “Two Stages for 
Performance in Aceh: From StateConflict to Syariah Politics”, in Barbara Hatley & Brett 
Hough (eds.), Performing Contemporary Indonesia: Celebrating Identity, Constructing Commu-
nity, Leiden - Brill & KITLV (2015), pp. 167-181
2 “Saya lapar, belum makan siang, ngapain nonton hukuman yang hipokrit kayak 
gini” (fieldnotes transcript 12/06/2015)
3 “Islam nggak ngajarin bikin malu orang di depan umum” (fieldnotes transcript 
12/06/2015)
4 In our 2011 collaborative research, Moch Nur Ichwan and I study offer an alter-
native bottom up approach in comparison to other works offering top down perspective 
of  Sharia. Our research is published as part of the IRP report entitled  Regime Change, 
Democracy & Islam. The Case of Indonesia Leiden: Leiden University (2013)
5 According to James Scott hidden transcripts are those acts of dissent that occur 
within a space and among a group of people that share the same position in a given re-
lation of dominance. These transcripts did not usually reach the other side of the power 
relationship because of the reaction they would entail (Scott 1990: 196).
6 Freud sees humor arises out of internal suppression of subjects. He locates the 
source of humor and comedy in the id which is in a constant struggle with the regulatory 
force of super-ego (Freud 1907, cf Kohlenberger 2015: 135).
7 The vast majority of anthropologists working on Indonesia have neglected hu-
mor as a research topic. Some early anthropologists studied humor from the perspective 
of folklore or media performance, but rarely as a resource for cultural analysis (see for 
example in Siegel 1979 & 1986; Sherzer & Sherzer 1987; Boellstorff 2005). In many eth-
nographic accounts, humor is not even mentioned in spite of the fact that it is a finely 
calibrated barometer of the preoccupations shared by members of a society or group.
8 There is always the possibility that sarcasm and satire can contribute to destabi-
lize and undermine the authoritarian powers (see for example in Kazarian 2010; Camps-
Febrer, 2012 on recent studies concerning the impact of humor in the Arab Spring). 
Majken Jul Sorensen’s study entitled “Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Re-
sistance to Oppression” published in Peace & Change, Vol. 33, No.2 (2008) focuses on 
an oppositional movement in Serbia called Otpor. This extraordinary study brought an 
example how the impact of humor could bring down the oppressive regime of Slobodan 
Milosevic.
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